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Montana Applications of the Last
Clear Chance Doctrine
By J. HOWARD TOELLE. *
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The student of a thousand years of Anglo-American legal
history marvels at the comparatively late development of the
law of Torts. Mr. Justice Holmes in 1870, reviewing an edi-
tion of Addison's work abridged for the use of Harvard Law
students, observed "we are inclined to think that Torts is not
a proper subject for a law book."' It is recorded that Joel
Bishop, proposing in 1853 to write a text on Torts, was as-
sured that there was no call for such a work, and that "if the
book were written by the most eminent and prominent author
that ever lived, not a dozen copies a year could be sold."' It
was not until the year 1859 that the first general work on
Torts was published, the American text by Hilliard, followed
the next year, 1860, by Addison on Torts, an English work.
With recognition thus late in the substantive law, it may
safely be said that no other branch of the law has in seventy-
five years undergone such rapid and extensive change, expan-
sion, and development as the law of Torts. Markedly acceler-
ated has been the growth of the last thirty years, a period of
the Restatement of the law of Torts, a vast outpouring of com-
ment and discussion in the legal periodicals, a period of ex-
tensive development in case law.
Especially late to develop was the law of negligence, of
contributory negligence, and of the last clear chance. Negli-
gence was scarcely recognized as a separate tort before the
early part of the nineteenth century. About the year 1825,
negligence emerging out of the action on the case, began to be
recognized as a separate basis of tort liability. Its rise coin-
cided closely with the industrial revolution. The increased
number of accidents caused by the industrial revolution, and
the invention of the railroads was a stimulating influence.
*Professor of Law and Acting Dean, Montana State University Law
School.
'Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HA1V. L. REv. 72 (1942) ; 22 NEB. L.
REv. 177 (1943).
'PROSsEn, ToRTS, Preface VII; Seavey, Supra, Note 1. "Torts were
considered piecemeal under such titles as ossault, defamation, deceit."
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About the same time, the disintegration of the old forms of
action and the disappearance of the distinction between direct
and indirect injuries as founded in trespass and case, paved
the way for a substantive law differentiation of intentional
injury, direct or indirect, versus the unintended tort of negli-
gence.'
One of the earliest English cases applying a doctrine of
contributory fault was Butterfield v. Forrester decided in 1809.'
It was not until the year 1842 that the celebrated donkey case of
Davies v. Mann' enabled an English court to give expression to
the doctrine which has since become known as that of the "last
clear chance." Thus, within a period of less than a hundred
years, our jurisdictions have found it necessary to analyze and
develop a doctrine of the greatest technical nicety arising out
of a branch of the law which in turn had been given an inde-
pendent existence only a few years previously and which is
still being dynamically formulated and moulded in the grist of
actual decisions as the cases arise. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that jurisdictions have differed in their application of
the last clear chance principles and that decisions in the same
jurisdiction are frequently irreconcilable from the earliest to
the latest.'
The formulation of the Torts Restatement has conduced to
clearer thinking on the subject. With emphasis on the time
sequence of events, defendant's conduct is tortious if immedi-
ately before the accident he has the superior opportunity to
avoid it, under circumstances involving:
(1) The discovered helpless peril (i.e. physical help-
lessness) of the injured person regardless of the
place of injury.'
'PRossaa, TORTS p. 171.
'(1809) 11 East 60. See also Cruden v. Fentham (1798) 2 Esp. (K.B.)
685, and Clay v. Wood (1803) 5 Esp. (K.B.) 44.
'(1842) 10 M & W. 546.
*Note the Colorado Survey in D.MUTH, Derogation of the Common Law
Rule. of Contributory Negligence, 7 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 161 (1935).
'RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §479 applies to the physically helple8s plaintiff,
thus, "A plaintiff who has negligently subjected himself to a risk of
harm from the defendant's subsequent negligence may recover for
harm caused thereby, if, Immediately preceding the harm;
(a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exercise of reason-
able vigilance and care, and
(b) the defendant
(I) Knows of the plaintiff's situation and realizes the
helpless peril involved therein; or
(II) knows of the plaintiff's situation and has reason to
realize the peril involved therein: or
2
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(2) The undiscovered helpless peril (i.e. physical help-
lessness) of the injured person at a place where
defendant is under a duty to keep a lookout as at
railroad crossings
(3) The discovered negligent inattention (i.e. mental
obliviousness) of the injured person regardless of
the place of injury.'
The defendant is not culpable, however, if the case involves
the undiscovered negligent inattention (i.e. mental oblivious-
ness) of the injured person.' Under the Missouri humanitari-
an doctrine, liability would also attach in this situation."
Since both parties are here mutually inattentive, the great
weight of authority is that this is not properly a last chance
situation. Neither party had a chance to avoid the accident
that the other did not have. The Missouri humanitarian doc-
trine arose in the eighties, a day of privilege for the railroads,
watered stock, undeveloped air brakes, undeveloped warning
signals and lights, unpredictable old dobbin, sympathy for the
injured man. It approaches an absolute liability principle.
'a
At the present time, $5,000 to $10,000 in insurance against per-
sonal injury liability on a car costs $14 to $18 in Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma, and the national av-
(III) would have discovered the plaintiff's situation and
thus had reason to realize the plaintiff's helpless peril
had he exercised the vigilance which it was his duty
to the plaintiff to exercise, and
(c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable




'RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §480 applies to the mentally inattentive plain-
tiff, thus, "A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable vigilance
could have observed the danger created by the defendant's negligence
in time to have avoided harm therefrom, may recover if, but only if,
the defendant
(a) knew of the plaintiff's situation, and
(b) realized or had reason to realize, that the plaintiff was in-
attentive, and therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time
to avoid the harm, and
(c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable
care and competence his then existing ability to avoid harm-
ing the plaintiff."
"PROsSER, TORTS, page 408; RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §480.
"Barrie v. St. Louis Transit Co. (1903) 102 Mo. App. 87, 76 S. W. 706;
Murphy v. Wabash R. Co. (1910) 228 Mo. 56, 128 S. W. 481; Maginnis
v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (1916) 268 Mo. 667, 187 S. W. 1165.
ua See the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L. R. 3, H. L. 330 which
has not been applied in Montana. King v. Miles City Irr. Ditch Co.
(1895) 16 Mont. 463, 41 P. 431; Jeffers v. Montana Power Co. (1923)
68 Mont. 114, 217 P. 652.
3
Toelle: Montana Applications of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1944
LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE
erage is $19.50; the cost is, however, $32 in Missouri where the
humanitarian doctrine obtains.' Missouri citizens generally
seem to be paying for the maintenance of the humanitarian
doctrine in the courts at a time when the conditions responsi-
ble for its adoption have largely passed. Carriers are no long-
er feared as ultra-hazardous. Farm animals appear bored with
the presence of means of faster transportation, there is in-
creasing social interest in transportation of all kinds.
H.
MONTANA CASES.
One of the earliest reported Montana cases" involving ap-
plication of last chance principles is the 1908 decision of
Neary v. Northern Pacific Railway Co." Deceased was a freight
conductor who had just brought his freight train into the
Billings yard; he became so absorbed in the task of checking
his train that he failed to observe the coming of the Northern
Pacific passenger train. He was struck and killed. Directed
verdict and judgment for defendants was reversed, and the
case remanded for a new trial. While the deceased was guilty
of contributory negligence in not looking and listening while
walking along the track, the court held that the question
whether the engineer could after discovery of the peril of the
"See table by MCCLEARY, The Bases of the Humanitarian Doctrine Re-
examined, 5 Mo. L. REV. 56, 87 (1940).
"'The first Montana case suggesting the last clear chance doctrine is
Riley v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (1908) 36 Mont. 545, 93 P. 948. In this
case, two men were run over and killed at a Billings street intersec-
tion at night. A switch-engine was being backed over the crossing.
The widow, as administrator of one of the men, sued and recovered
a verdict and judgment of $12,600 which the higher court affirmed.
The complaint appeared to be one in primary negligence setting forth
various grounds of fault to which defendant answered contributory
negligence. There was no reply of the last clear chance, and upon
appeal, defendant claimed error in that the doctrine "if such it may
be termed, of the last clear chance" was relied upon in argument and
no such issue was raised by the reply. To this the court observed:
"There may be cases where the claim that the defendant had the last
clear chance to avoid the injury, being relied upon by the plaintiff as
a basis for affirmative testimony in rebuttal must be set forth in a
reply in answer to defendant's plea of contributory negligence. But
in this case no such necessity arose. All of the testimony relating to
the last clear chance went in under the issues made by the complaint
and answer without objection. Under these circumstances the plain-
tiff could rely upon the so-called doctrine." The complaint was long.
The defendant's alleged negligence mostly primary was presented un-
der various instructions. One cannot find that the court had any def-
inite theory for a last chance case. Apparently, it was, in 1907, only
faintly aware of the doctrine and its implications.
"(1908) 37 Mont. 461, 97 P. 944.
4
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conductor have stopped his train and prevented the accident
should have been submitted to the jury.
On this basis, the case was correctly decided.' Deceased
was not physically helpless; he was merely mentally inatten-
tive. The case would, therefore, be one of contributory negli-
gence unless defendant actually discovered the deceased in
time to avoid the injury. Doubt has arisen on the basis of
what the court said rather than what it decided. Thus said
the court at page 474 of 37 Montana:
"The general rule that one's own negligence in such
case precludes recovery is subject to the qualification that,
where the defendant has discovered, or should have discov-
ered, the peril of the plaintiff's or deceased's position, and
it is apparent that he cannot escape therefrom or for any
reason does not make an effort to do so, the duty becomes
imperative for the defendant to use all reasonable care to
avoid the injury; and, if this is not done, he becomes li-
able, notwithstanding the negligence of the injured
party."
Further, said the court:
". .. the rule applies to technical trespassers as well as to
employees. "
Now while the application of the unconscious last chance doc-
trine either to technical trespassers or to merely negligently
inattentive employees would by the Restatement and the
weight of authority rule, be indefensible, it should be noted
that the court, at page 475 of 37 Montana, says:
"The engineer evidently saw him, for the evidence
tends to show that he sounded the whistle. If this was
done while the train was near the caboose, he had more
than twice the distance necessary to stop the train."
This, the ratio decidendi, is believed to be satisfactory.
In Melzner v. Northern Pacific Railway Co.' an admin-
istrator sued to recover damages for injury resulting in the
death of a boy by being struck by a railroad train. The com-
plaint alleged that defendant's engineer saw deceased in the
path of his engine, and "did see that the said boy was in dan-
ger of being struck by the said engine, that the boy was unob-
servant of the approach of said engine, and that he then, after
so seeing the boy in danger, negligently drove the said engine
wRESTATEMENT, TORTS, §480.
"(1912) 46 Mont. 162, 127 P. 146.
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against the boy," inflicting injury from which he died. It was
held that the complaint was sufficient under the last clear
chance doctrine. This is the discovered peril or conscious last
chance doctrine.1' The Melzner case and its companion case,
Haddox v. Northern Pacific Railway Co." namely, the father's
action against the railway company based on the same facts, are
thought to be satisfactory applications of the mental inattention
rule.
In Dahmer v. Northern Pacific Railway Co." plaintiff had
judgment. Defendants appealed. The case was reversed and
remanded for new trial. Plaintiff alleged that at the Huntley
station of the Northern Pacific Railway Co., he awaited his
mother's arrival on No. 4, eastbound, about one o'clock in the
morning, that the train was several hours late, and that No. 3,
westbound, was about due, that he remained to await a friend
who was to arrive on No. 3, that while he awaited No. 3, he
was hit a heavy blow on the head, that he fell on the rails, nnd
while in the act of crawling off the track, the train caught him
causing the loss of both feet. The court decided that the evi-
dence did not justify the conclusion that the engineer discov-
ered the position of plaintiff, and since Nos. 3 and 4 were
through trains, neither being scheduled to stop at Hluntley,
there was no duty on the part of defendant to keep a lookout
at a remote station at an early hour of the morning when there
was no anticipation of passengers or others being there to car-
ry on business with the company.
The court says that the expression "or should have dis-
covered" as used in the Neary case, supra, was unfortunate,
and that a case calling for the application of the last clear
chance doctrine must embody three elements, viz:
(1) The exposed condition brought about by the neg-
ligence of plaintiff or the injured person;
(2) The actual discovery by defendant of the perilous
situation of the person or property in time to avert
injury, and
(3) The failure of defendant thereafter to use ordinary
care to avert the injury.
So, said the court, the rule is applied generally, citing Davies v.
Mann.' The doctrine has no application here said the court be-
cause there was no antecedent negligence on the part of plain-
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §480.
0(1912) 46 Mont. 185, 127 P. 152.
0(1913) 48 Mont. 152, 136 P. 1059.Supra, Note 5.
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tiff. The rule is limited in application to cases where plain-
tiff has by his own act been exposed to injury at the hands
of the defendant.
Thus, was started the line of cases in which the conscious
last clear chance or discovered peril rule was said to be the
Montana doctrine. On the facts, it is not, however, believed
that the case was incorrectly decided. Plaintiff was, we may
concede, in a condition of helpless peril, but he was not in-
jured at a place where, or time when, the defendant was under
a duty to keep a lookout. Both conditions must concur in or-
der that plaintiff recover.' Since the evidence failed to es-
tablish actual discovery, the court, it is believed, correctly held
defendant not liable.
In Singer v. Missoula Street Railway Co." plaintiff recov-
ered for personal injury sustained while riding a horse based
on collision with an electric car of the defendant upon the Hig-
gins Avenue bridge over the Missoula River. The case was af-
firmed on the assumption, in the law of last clear chance, that
given negligence by plaintiff in going over the bridge, or not
retiring therefrom, when the horse became restive, the de-
fendant motorman was under a duty when he observed plain-
tiff's perilous position immediately to take such precautions
as he could to avoid a collision and that he had been negligent
in failing to do so. Likewise, in Anderson v. Missoula Street
Railway Co." plaintiff was thrown from a buggy on the same
bridge. The horse attached to the buggy became unmanageable
upon the approach of defendant's street car. Plaintiff recov-
ered judgment, and defendant appealed on the ground that cer-
tain instructions incorporating the doctrine of the last clear
chance injected a principle foreign to the issue. The court re-
affirmed the three essentials of the discovered peril doctrine as
laid down in the Dahmer case." All these elements must concur
or the rule has no application, said the court. The court found
no suggestion in the complaint that plaintiff's exposed condi-
tion was brought about by any negligence of hers, or imputable
to her, and held that the instructions complained of instead of
announcing the doctrine of last clear chance announce the law
of primary negligence, and having done so with substantial ac-
curacy, the judgment was affirmed.
The first of these cases is believed to be a proper applica-
'RESTATEMENT, ToRTs, §479.
'(1913) 47 Mont. 218, 131 P. 630.
0(1917) 54 Mont. 83, 167 P. 841.
"SSupra, Note 19.
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tion of the conscious last chance or discovered peril doctrine."
As to the status of a traveller on a horse along the highway,
query ? One may be physically helpless to control a spirited an-
imal, and one may be mentally inattentive on a gentle old "nag."
The place is one where a municipal trolley car motorman is
under a duty to keep a lookout. However, the facts here es-
tablished actual discovery. The case cannot, therefore, be
cited to support the unconscious last chance doctrine. In the
second case, what is said on this doctrine is dehors the issue
in the case; the case is properly a study in primary or simple
negligence.
In Doichinoff v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co." the Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court judgment in favor of plaintiff admin-
istrator. The action was on the last chance theory under the
federal employer's liability act for the death of one Koleff
who was run over by a locomotive in the service of the rail-
way. The answer alleged that the deceased stepped upon the
track immediately in front of the locomotive, that his presence
was not discovered and could not have been discovered by the
exercise of reasonable or any care. Discovery of the peril of
Koleff or duty to discover him was charged in the alternative.
In this respect, the court said the pleading was indefinite, but
in the absence of reasonable attack by motion or special de-
murrer particularly pointing out the defect, the allegations
were regarded sufficient to -state 'a cause of action. At page
589 of 51 Montana the court said:
"It is true that there is not in this record any direct
evidence that Koleff was actually discovered by the en-
ginemen in time to avoid the accident; but the fact may
be established by circumstantial evidence. If, in this in-
stance, it has been made to appear that Koleff was walk-
ing upon the railroad track in broad daylight 200 feet or
more in advance of Middleton's locomotive; that he was
apparently unaware of danger; that the view from the
locomotive was entirely unobstructed; that the enginemen
were at their respective posts of duty on the locomotive,
and were keeping a lookout ahead in the direction of Ko-
leff; that the locomotive could have been stopped within
from ten to thirty feet considering the speed at which it
was moving, no one would question the right of a jury to
say that Koleff's position was discovered in ample time to
avoid striking him ... "
-RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §479.
(1916) 51 Mont. 582, 154 P. 924.
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And in Stricklin v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co." the court ex-
plained the alternative allegations of the Doichinoff case by
saying that Koleff was an employee, and was actively engaged
in the discharge of duty at the time of the accident, that the
alternative allegations were good under the federal employers'
liability act, that the company owed a duty to keep a lookout
for employees, in a place of danger, that contributory negli-
gence under the federal act does not bar recovery but may
diminish the damages and that it was to avoid this contin-
gency that the doctrine of the last clear chance was injected
into the case. On the facts, however, the case is one of a neg-
ligently inattentive plaintiff, and in such case, there is no li-
ability unless defendant actually discovered plaintiff's inat-
tention in time to avoid the injury. It is believed the case was,
therefore, correctly decided."
In McIntyre v. Northern Pacific Railway Co." a boy tres-
passer was killed in the company's railroad yard in Butte.
The complaint against the Railway and its servants alleged
that the deceased was carelessly and negligently upon the right
of way but unobservant of the approach of the locomotive,
that the defendants saw the deceased and that by the exer-
cise of ordinary care they could have avoided injuring him.
Defendant's answer denied discovery. It was held that the
burden of proof directly or by circumstantial evidence was
upon the plaintiff and that the evidence was insufficient to
warrant submission to the jury of the issue framed by plain-
tiff's allegation and defendants' denial that the engine crew
saw decedent in a position of peril in time to avoid striking
him. The court affirmed that under the doctrine of the last
clear chance, the duty to avoid injury arises only when the in-
jured party is actually discovered in a position of peril, and
apparently unconscious of his danger or unable to extricate
himself, and the failure of the defendant to exercise reason-
able care to avoid.injuring him after such discovery consti-
tutes the breach of duty. This decision is properly baseu on
the mental inattention of the boy. No duty arose unless de-
fendant discovered his condition of negligent inattention in
time to avoid the accident."
In Stricklin v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co.' it was alleged that de.
ceased was upon a bridge or trestle of the company's road
'7(1921) 59 Mont. 367, 197 P. 839.
'RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §480.
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that an unobstructed view of his position could be had for more
than half a mile; that he was not observant of the approach of
the company locomotive, and that defendants saw, or by the
exercise of ordinary care, could have seen his position of peril
and his unobservant condition, but that defendants negligent-
ly failed to warn the deceased, and negligently permitted the
locomotive to strike the said Stricklin inflicting injuries from
which he died. At the trial, defendants objected to the intro-
duction of evidence because of plaintiff's failure to state a
cause of action. The objection was sustained, and plaintiff
declining to amend, plaintiff was non-suited. The Supreme
Court affirmed on the ground that where the complaint al-
leges in the alternative two statements of fact, one of which is
sufficient to constitute a cause of action and the other not,
they neutralize each other and subject the pleading to a gen-
eral demurrer. It was reasoned that Stricklin was a naked
trespasser, and that the only duty devolving on the defendants
was to refrain from wantonly or wilfully injuring him or to
exercise reasonable care to avoid injuring him after his peril-
ous situation was actually discovered, and it was apparent that
he was insensible to the impending danger. The defendants
did not owe a duty to keep a lookout or give warning signals
or discover the trespasser's peril, and therefore the allegation
that they should have discovered the danger to which his neg-
ligence had exposed him does not charge a breach of duty, and
the case comes directly within the rule that the alternative al-
legations neutralize each other and subject the complaint to a
general demurrer or to a motion to exclude evidence.
It is believed that the Sthicklin case was correctly decided,
for while a trespasser on a trestle may be a plaintiff in helpless
peril, he is at a place where the defendant is under no duty to
keep a lookout for him.' There can, therefore, be no liability
in the absence of actual discovery. The case can be criticized
only in what the court said that it "is established by the re-
peated decisions of this court," that the conscious last clear
chance rule is the Montana doctrine.
Thus, looking to what the court has said in these "repeat-
ed decisions" plaintiff must in his complaint admit by allega-
tion his own exposed condition, i.e., his own negligence, de-
fendant's discovery, and defendant's failure thereafter to ex-
ercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff. This rule,
while objectionable in substantive law as making no allowance
for unconscious last clear chance cases, is objectionable also on
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §479.
10
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the procedural side in that plaintiff often cannot tell when he
prepares his complaint whether his case is best as one in pri-
mary negligence or in last clear chance. Often he cannot make
a decision on the theory of his case until defendant, by an-
swer, pleads plaintiff's contributory negligence, or until he
has had an opportunity to interview witnesses, or even during
the trial based on the exigency of the evidence. Many juris-
dictions, by what is regarded as the better rule, allow plaintiff
to reply last clear chance after plaintiff's general allegations
in the complaint of defendant's negligence and defendant's an-
swer of contributory negligence.' The rule as laid down in the
Dahmer case precludes this.
In Mihelich v. Butte Electric Ry. Co." counsel attempted
greater flexibility in the theory of the case by alleging three
counts, namely, count one based on the primary negligence of
defendant, count two based on the doctrine of last clear
chance, i.e., actual discovery by defendant of plaintiff's posi-
tion of peril, and count three, that the defendant "wilfully and
wantonly" ran the car against plaintiff. Defendant, by an-
swer, pleaded contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff
and plaintiff failed to reply whereupon the lower court dis-
missed the action on the ground that, there being new matter
in the answer, plaintiff was in default for failure to reply.
The Supreme Court affirmed as to count one on the ground
that a plea of contributory negligence where plaintiff's action
is one in primary negligence requires a reply; but as to counts
two and three, found no reply necessary since a last clear
chance case is made out by the averments of the complaint in
which plaintiff admits his own negligence making an answer
of contributory negligence surplusage, and as to wilful and
wanton conduct found no amount of contributory negligence
to be a defense. The cause was remanded for trial on the is-
sues presented by counts two and three and defendant's an-
swer. By way of commentary, it is believed that to allow the
last clear chance to be developed in the reply is more in line
with the code ideal of a more simplified pleading; it would
probably also lead to fewer purely procedural decisions. An
allegation which sets forth that the defendant is the proximate
cause of the accident should be held sufficiently general, so
that under it the plaintiff could show that this was the case,
either because of the defendant's sole negligence, or because
of the defendant's supervening negligence."
"CLARK, CODE PLEADING, p. 211.
" (1929) 85 Mont. 604, 281 P. 540.
'CLARK, CODE PLEADING, p. 211.
11
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In Westerdale v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co." two seventeen
year old boys were riding in a Ford automobile and were
struck by defendant's locomotive at a crossing near Bozeman.
Westerdale, driver of the Ford, was killed, and Schnider, his
companion, was seriously injured. The actions were tried to-
gether. When the auto was strupk by defendant's engine it
became lodged in some manner on the step of the tender and
was carried along the track for a distance of more than 400
feet without any injury or marks on the railroad ties, but dur-
ing the last 100 or 150 feet the ties were badly torn and splint-
ered. The lower court withdrew from the jury the question
of negligence in failing to sound the whistle and ring the bell,
and of failing to use proper care to see the approaching auto
before it was struck by the engine. The cases were tried upon
the last clear chance theory that the injury and death were
caused after the engine had traveled farther than it should
have (i.e. an entire distance of 640 feet) had the engineer used
reasonable care to stop it after his discovery of the boys on the
crossing at the time of or slightly before the impact. Lower
court verdicts and judgments of about $3000 in each case were
affirmed. While the boys were no doubt, originally in a con-
dition of negligent inattention in this case, after their car was
lodged on the step of the tender their condition changed to
that of helpless peril. The unconscious last chance rule' might
well have been applied to the case, but since the evidence es-
tablished actual discovery by defendants in time to avoid in-
jury and death, it was unnecessary for the court to consider
the case other than under the doctrine of discovered peril as
laid down in the Dahmer case.
in Collins v. Crimp,' a father sued in two capacities to re-
cover for the death of his 12 year old boy (1) on his own be-
half, and (2) as administrator of his son's estate. On appeal
from judgments for plaintiff, the court reversed the case, and
directed judgment for defendant. Plaintiff did not allege neg-
ligence on the part of defendant, driver of a Buick auto, re-
sulting in the collision, but did allege that the boy was thrown
on the right fender of defendant's car, that defendant saw or
should have seen the boy's perilous position, and negligently
continued to drive east a distance of 45 feet at a speed of 15
miles per hour until the Collins boy fell off the fender and the
car passed over him. The Supreme Court held that the evi-
dence did not warrant a finding that, during the almost infini-
(1929) 84 Mont. 1, 273 P. 1051.
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §479.
"(1932) 91 Mont. 326, 8 P. (2d) 796.
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tesimal period of time between the moment the boy landed on the
fender and the instant he slid to the pavement, the defendant
was negligent in failing sooner to apply his brakes, which neg-
ligence could be considered the proximate cause of the boy's
death. In retrospect, one is inclined to agree with the court.
When thrown upon the fender, the boy was in a condition of
helpless peril,' and a motorist is under a duty to keep a look-
out, but it would be difficult to say that defendant failed to
exercise reasonable care to avoid the death in the short time at
his command after discovery or after he should have discov-
ered the boy's peril. The case contains no suggestion that the
Montana rule is other than that of discovered peril as laid
down in the Dahmer case.
In Pollard v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co.,. plaintiff's com-
plaint contained both a count in primary negligence and a last
clear chance count. At the close of plaintiff's evidence, plaintiff
withdrew the first count, and the case proceeded under the
theory of the last clear chance. Verdict and judgment for
plaintiff in the sum of $2900 was affirmed. Plaintiff, stalled
on the crossing in his Ford delivery truck, went down on one
knee with head under the dashboard and began checking the
coils, thereafter paying no attention to anything but the work
in hand. Plaintiff estimated the time he was working on the
coils before the accident as about a minute. He heard an "aw-
ful roar," and the defendant's passenger train crashed his
ear. The court distinguished trespassers upon railroad tracks
from a collision occurring at a crossing in that train operatives
are under a duty to keep a vigilant lookout at crossings and
therefore an allegation in the alternative that the train oper-
atives saw or would have seen if they had exercised ordinary
care was held to be sufficient in crossing cases. However, the
court required actual discovery as an evidentiary matter in
this case, saying that whether the engineer actually saw plain-
tiff in his perilous position, a matter provable by circumstan-
tial evidence, was for the jury to determine.
It is believed that the case was properly disposed of on the
record. Plaintiff was suing for personal injury; he was so ab-
sorbed in the checking of the coils that he failed to note the
coming of the train; in other words, the case was one of mental
inattention rather than of helpless peril. Accordingly, defend-
ant's duty arose only based on actual discovery. Had plaintiff
been suing for the demolition of his truck, it is likely that it
'ORESTATEMENT, TORTS, §479.
-(1932) 92 Mont. 119, 11 P. (2d) 271.
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would have been impossible to get the stalled truck off the cross-
ing before the coming of the train. Such a case would have pre-
sented features of the unconscious last chance doctrine. The
Washington decision in Nichol v. Oregon Washington R. & Nay.
Co."a presents such a case.
In Armstrong v. Butte By. Co.," plaintiff sued for damages
occasioned by the collision of defendant's train with plaintiff's
automobile. Plaintiff's complaint was grounded in primary
negligence on defendant's part in failing to ring the bell or
blow the whistle at the crossing. Defendant answered by way
of general denial and an affirmative plea of contributory neg-
ligence. Plaintiff's reply admitted that he carelessly drove
his auto onto the crossing but alleged defendant's last clear
chance. Defendant demurred to the reply on the ground of its
insufficiency in law and upon its face. The higher court held
that a judgment for plaintiff cannot be based upon allegations
which appear in the reply only, that the shifting from primary
negligence in the complaint to the last clear chance doctrine
in the reply constituted an abandonment of the cause of action
set out in the complaint, and that plaintiff is precluded from
setting up his cause of action in the reply.
By way of dictum, the court said that "as an aid to
court and counsel in case another action be instituted," de-
fendant's contention that the case of Pollard v. Oregon Short
Line By. Co.," should be overruled in so far as it permits plain-
tiff to plead that part of the last clear chance relating to de-
fendant's discovery of plaintiff in a perilous position in the al-
ternative is not well taken. The court conceded that prior Mon-
tana cases had enunciated the actual discovery rule, but asserted
that those cases had in effect been overruled in the Pollard ease
as applied to a crossing and other places where the defendant
had reasonable grounds to anticipate the presence of persons
and negligently failed to keep a lookout. Said the court: "We
reaffirm the holding in the Pollard case. It brings this court
in harmony with the progressive and enlightened view
throughout the nation on this subject as reiterated in the Re-
statement of the Law of Torts. Section 479 thereof states the
prevailing rule throughout the nation as follows" (here the
court cited Section 479 verbatim.) The case is notable in that
it is the first Montana case citing the last clear chance pro-
visions of the Torts Restatement. It is also notable in that to-
gether with the Pollard case, it marks a definite overruling of
'a71 Wash. 409, 128 P. 628, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 174.
"(1940) 110 Mont. 133, 99 P. (2d) 223.
"Supra, Note 40.
14
Montana Law Review, Vol. 5 [1944], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol5/iss1/9
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
the language used in a long line of Montana cases in which the
actual discovery or conscious last clear chance rule had been
enunciated as the Montana doctrine. Now we are told that
the unconscious last clear chance doctrine is also to be applied
in proper cases. The two decisions will be hailed with satis-
faction by the profession as aligning the court with the weight
of authority and the "enlightened" view. However, it is to
be hoped that the court will not now move to the extreme of
the humanitarian doctrine. There may be excuse for some
trepidation at this point owing to a statement in the Arm-
strong case at page 136 of 110 Montana referring to the last
clear chance doctrine as "what is usually referred to as the
humanitarian doctrine." Also by the statement in the Pollard
case at page 133 of 92 Montana:
"Many cases, on the fact conditions shown, indicate
or declare that the continuing contributory negligence of
the injured party takes the case out of the rule of the last
clear chance, unless it is shown that for some reason .he is
in a position wherein it is physically impossible for him to
extricate himself; but this is not in accord with the dec-
larations of this court in the Neary and Doichinoff Cases
Now it is submitted that the continuing contributory neg-
ligence of the injured party does take the case out of the last
clear chance rule. At any rate, this is the weight of authority
and Restatement view. If the plaintiff is mentally inattentive
-"continuing contributory negligence"--and defendant fails
to discover plaintiff's condition of inattention, they are both
in fault-both equally mentally inattentive-and neither
should have a cause of action against the other. But, if plain-
tiff is reduced to a condition of helpless peril ("physically im-
possible for him to extricate himself "-non-continuing con-
tributory negligence), and the place is one where defendant
was under a duty to keep a lookout which duty was breached,
then defendant's liability attaches.
These principles are not contra to the decisions in the
Neary and Doichinoff cases where, as previously indicated,
the court was actually dealing with negligently inattentive
plaintiffs and properly on the record affirmed the judgments
on the ground of actual discovery by defendant of the other's
mental inattention in time to avoid the accident.
What courts say is interesting; what they do, more inter-
esting. In summary of last clear chance cases in Montana, it
appears that;
15
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(1) The court became aware of the doctrine in 1908 in the
Neary Case." The court said the doctrine would apply to em-
ployees discovered or who should have been discovered by de-
fendant, and even that the rule was applicable to technical
trespassers,-an indefensible position. The case was, however,
actually decided on the ground of actual discovery of a neg-
ligently inattentive employee, and is, therefore, in accord with
Section 480 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts and the
weight of authority. Likewise, the Doichinoff employee case "
was decided on the ground of actual discovery based on cir-
cumstantial evidence. The explanation of the pleading in this
case as developed in the Stricklin case,' was that the alterna-
tive allegation "discovered or should have discovered" would
be good under the Federal Employer's Liability Act to avoid
diminution of the damages under the federal rule on the effect
of contributory negligence. But this reason is no longer valid
if the language of the Pollard" and Armstrong" decisions is to
be applied, those cases indicating a disposition to apply in
proper case, the orthodox unconscious last chance rule. Even
as to employees, as a condition to the application of the rule,
the prime question is, "Was the employee in a condition of
helpless peril?''
(2) Beginning with the Dahmer case" in 1913, the Mon-
tana rule was said to be one of discovered peril (conscious
last clear chance) and this continued to be the Montana enun-
ciation until the Pollard case" decided in 1932.
(3) However, the Supreme Court decisions during this
period, 1908-1932, cannot be said to be contra to the unconscious
last chance doctrine as developed in Section 479 of the Restate-
ment of the Law of Torts. Apparently the litigious cases on
appeal involved a proper application of the conscious last clear
chance doctrine. What effect the enunciation of a sole conscious
last chance or discovered peril doctrine had upon the work of
trial courts, in discouraging the prosecution of unconscious last
chance cases, in counsel's attempts to fit facts into .the discovery
rule and failing when he might have succeeded on the undiscov-
ery rule, in getting the case to the jury, and in the instructions
given to the jury, and in militating against appeals in undis-
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(4) The Pollard' and Armstrong1 cases now indicate a
disposition to apply the unconscious last chance doctrine in
proper case, but neither is a decision under the doctrine. The
Pollard case on the facts involves a negligently inattentive (not
a helpless peril) plaintiff, and while defendant is under a gen-
eral duty to keep a lookout at crossings, this applies only to
plaintiffs fre6 from fault, or (on pleading and proof in last
chance cases) to plaintiffs in a condition of helpless peril. On
the facts of the Pollard case, therefore, plaintiff was properly
allowed recovery because defendant discovered plaintiff's men-
tal inattention in time to avoid the injury. As a decision, the
Armstrong case involves a procedural question only.
(5) While the recent Pollard and Armstrong cases cite
the early Neary' and Doichinoff cases as giving support to the
unconscious last clear chance doctrine, neither of those early
cases can properly be cited as decisions under the doctrine.
There is no Montana appellate case where, on the facts, plaintiff
recovered based on application of unconscious last chance prin-
ciples. The Westerdale" and Collinse cases were most promising
on the facts, but were decided under the doctrine of discovered
peril.
The result of the court's disposition of the Dahmer, Neary,
Doichinoff, Pollard, and Armstrong cases is that, as a study in
procedure, plaintiff must allege a last chance case in the com-
plaint if he expects to recover on that theory. He thus alleges
his exposed condition (i.e. admits his own negligence). If the
complaint shows plaintiff to be a trespasser, actual discovery by
defendant must be alleged. If the complaint shows the accident
to have occurred at a crossing or other place where the defend-
ant has reasonable ground to anticipate the presence of persons
(i.e. at places where it owes a duty to keep a lookout), the alle-
gation may be in the alternative, i.e. that defendant saw or
would have seen plaintiff if defendant had exercised ordinary
care. This applies to the testing of the complaint on demurrer
for insufficient facts, and, upon objection to the introduction of
evidence.
When the parties advance to the trial, the question comes
to be one of the character of the plaintiff's exposed position.
If the evidence develops that plaintiff was only negligently in-
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actual discovery by defendant of plaintiff's inattention in time
to avoid the accident must be proved. And this should b. the
rule even though the accident occurred at a crossing or other
place where the defendant is generally under a duty to keep
a lookout, including actions brought by defendant's employees.
If, however, the evidence develops that plaintiff was in
a condition of helpless peril (physically helpless) and the place
is one where defendant was under a duty to keep a lookout,
plaintiff may recover even though he was not discovered but
should have been discovered if the defendant had performed
the duty owed to this type of plaintiff. Two things are, there-
fore, necessary to the application of the unconscious last chance
doctrine, (1) a helpless peril type plaintiff, and (2) an accident
at a place where defendant is under a duty to keep a lookout.
The leading case best illustrating the situation is the Utah
case of Teakle v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. B. Co." In that case,
defendant's train was being backed over a public crossing.
Plaintiff's intestate was negligent in not keeping a lookout,
and defendant's servants were .concurrently negligent in not
keeping a lookout. Plaintiff's intestate on being knocked
down, was precipitated under the cars. The train was 180 feet
long, and defendant was killed by the fire-box of the engine.
It was held that while plaintiff's intestate could not have re-
covered for the injury in being knocked down, plaintiff's ad-
ministrator could recover for the death. When the deceased
was struck by the train and rendered helpless, the effect of his
antecedent or contributory negligence was spent. His condi-
tion passed from that of negligent inattention (mental obliv-
iousness) to that of helpless peril (physical helplessness). Had
the defendant's engineer then been alert to the duty he owed
to keep a lookout at crossings, he could have stopped the train
in time to avoid killing the intestate.
A pedestrian whose foot is stuck in the frog of a crossing
and who is struggling to extricate himself would, no doubt, be
regarded in a condition of helpless peril; he is also in a place
where defendant owes a duty to keep a lookout; the two es-
sentials, therefore, concur for liability. A person caught on a
railroad trestle may be physically helpless to extricate him-
self, but since defendant owes no duty to keep a lookout at
such place, one of the two essentials for application of the un-
conscious last chance doctrine is lacking.
When the facts indicate discovery of a negligently inat-
tentive plaintiff, the question may arise as to what it is nec-
(1907) 32 Utah 276, 90 P. 402.
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essary for defendant to discover. Some courts hold that de-
fendant must in fact realize plaintiff's danger and his inatten-
tion, but most,7 by what is regarded as the preferable view,
require only that he discover the situation, and that the dan-
ger and lack of attentioh be apparent to a reasonable man.'
This may be interpreted to the extent that defendant in many
situations may reasonably assume that plaintiff will look out
for himself, until he has reason to believe the contrary.
III.
THE FUTURE OF THE DOCTRINE.
Given present conceptions of the effect of contributory
negligence, both the conscious and unconscious last chance doc-
trines are essential to an enlightened jurisprudence. The ap-
plication of both theories will not, however, produce sufficient
flexibility for all cases. The last chance doctrine has been
labelled by some, a makeshift,' a transition doctrine, a way
station on the road to apportionment of the damages. The case
of Mihelich v. Butte Electric Ry. Co.' interprets last clear
chance in terms of the law of proximate cause. Said the court
at page 619 of 85 Montana:
"Presupposing, then, that both plaintiff and defend-
ant are guilty of negligence and thereafter the plaintiff
remains passive and oblivious to his danger, and the de-
fendant, after discovering the perilous situation of the
plaintiff, could have avoided the accident by the exercise
of reasonable care but did not employ the means at his
5'PRossER, TORTS, p. 413.
"'See RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §480. "The defendant is liable only if he
realizes or has reason to realize that the plaintiff is inattentive and
consequently in peril ... it is not necessary that the circumstances be
such as to convince the defendant that the plaintiff is inattentive and,
therefore, In danger. It is enough that the circumstances are such as
to indicate a reasonable chance that this is the case .... If there is
anything in the demeanor or conduct of the plaintiff which to a rea-
sonable man in the defendant's position would indicate that the plain-
tiff is I-attentive, and, therefore, will or may not discover the ap-
proach of the train, the engineer must take such steps, as a reasonable
man would think necessary under the circumstances .... If the en-
gineer sees a vehicle with the side curtains so drawn as to obstruct
the driver's view approaching on a day so windy as to make it doubt-
ful whether the whistle will be heard, he may not be entitled to as-
sume that the driver will discover the approach of the train and may
be liable if he fails to exercise reasonable care to bring his train un-
der the necessary control."
"PROSSER, TORTS, p. 410; James, Last Clear Chance, A Transitory
Doctrine, 47 YALE L. J. 704 (1938).
S'upra, Note 34.
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command to avoid it, there is a break in the sequence of
events and defendant's last act of negligence becomes the
sole proximate cause of the injury, while his initial negli-
gence and the primary negligence of the plaintiff become
but remote causes thereof .... If the plaintiff could, at the
last, have avoided the injury by the exercise of reasonable
care, in spite of the subsequent negligence of the defend-
ant, he has failed to embrace 'the last clear chance'."
While this explanation of last clear chance is the one most
often given, it is quite out of line with modern ideas of
proximate cause. In last chance cases, plaintiff's negligence
has not only been a cause, but a substantial one as well. Fur-
ther, it cannot be said that injury through the defendant's
negligence was not within the risk which the plaintiff has
created. If the injury should be to a third person as a pedes-
trian near the scene of a collision or a passenger in one of the
vehicles, plaintiff's negligence would clearly be recognized as
a responsible cause. It is quite artificial to say that another
rule should apply when plaintiff himself is injured.
Some courts say that the defendant's later negligence in-
volves a higher degree of fault. This may be true for many
cases of discovery of plaintiff's helpless peril; it does not ex-
plain cases where defendant failed to make discovery, was
merely slow, clumsy, inadvertent, or erred in judgment. The
last wrongdoer rule savours of the medieval notion that courts
should have particular regard for the directness of the injury,
early the basis for recovery in actions of trespass and later
for the procedural distinction between trespass and case. The
last wrongdoer is not necessarily the worst wrongdoer.
The true explanation is, no doubt, a dislike for the de-
fense of contributory negligence in many situations which has
led courts to regard the last wrongdoer as the worst wrong-
doer, or, at least, the decisive one. The rationale of last clear
chance is thus closely tied to the rationale of contributory neg-
ligence. It was, no doubt, unfortunate that common law
courts, contrary to the rule in admiralty and in civil law coun-
tries, adopted the rule that contributory negligence on the part
of plaintiff should absolutely bar recovery.
. Perhaps no one theory can explain the defense of contrib-
utory negligence. Some say it has a penal basis, and that
plaintiff is denied recovery to punish him for his own miscon-
duct, some, that the plaintiff must come into court with clean
hands, some, that it rests upon voluntary assumption of risk.
All of these theories are subject to criticism. Again to use
the illustration of the colliding of autos as a result of which a
20
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pedestrian is injured, the negligence of one driver is not held
to relieve the other of liability; as a study in proximate
cause," it should hardly have any different effect when one
driver sues the other. Emphasis on the penal and clean hands
theories might lead to denial of recovery to the careful oper-
ator of a car enroute to play golf on Sunday contrary to the
statutory blue laws as against the doctor negligently operating
his vehicle while enroute to see a patient. And assumption of
risk requires knowledge of risk lacking in contributory negli-
gence. It is more realistic to regard the defense as an expres-
sion of the terse individualism of the common law which makes
the personal interest of parties dependent upon their own care
and prudence.' Contributory fault might be a better label
since negligence requires a duty and contributory negligence
requires no duty as generally understood; and instead of its
being conduct creating an undue risk of harm to others, one
can only say that it is conduct involving undue risk of harm
to the plaintiff himself.' With modern change in social view-
points, the defense is looked upon with increasing disfavor,
and various attempts have been made to modify its rigors. Of
these the last clear chance theory is the most prominent.
In application, the last chance doctrine is criticized on the
ground that oftentimes the greater the defendant's negligence,
tie less his liability. The driver who looks carefully and dis-
covers the danger, and is thereafter slow in applying his
brakes, may be liable, while the driver who does not look, or
who has no effective brakes, may escape liability." The rule
has also been criticized as, at times, absolving plaintiff entirely
from his own negligence, and placing the loss on defendant
whose fault may be the lesser of the two. Some thoughtful
writers have therefore recently taken the position that we may
well look to the admiralty rule of divided damages and the
civil law rule of comparative fault and that the future devel-
opment of the law of contributory negligence may well be in
"Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. Rav. 233 (1908).
OSchofield, Davies v. Mann, Theories of Contributory Negligence, 3
HARV. L. REv. 270 (1890).
'Bohlen, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 784.
"Smith v. Norfolk & S. R. Co. (1894) 114 N. C. 728, 19 S. E. 863, 923;
25 L. R. A. 287; PROSSER, TORTS, 415. "If the defendant, after discov-
ering the plaintiff's peril, does all that can reasonably be expected
of him, the fact that his efforts are defeated by antecedent lack of
preparation or a previous course of negligent conduct is not sufficient
to make him liable. All that is required of him is that he use care-
fully his then available ability." RESTATEMENT, ToRTs, §479. Contra,
British Columbia Elec. R. Co. v. Loach. [1916] 1 A. C. 719.
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the direction of common law or statutory apportionment of the
damages.'
"James. Last Clear Chance, A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L. J.
704; McIntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 H&itv. L. REv.
1225; PRossEn, TORTS, 416.
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